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TWO THEORIES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Alden .D. Miller*
A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE. By Jan Gorecki. New York:
Columbia University Press. 1979. Pp. xv, 185. $15.
A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE. By Hyman Gross. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. 1979. Pp. xviii, 521. $6.
Both Jan Gorecki 1 and Hyman Gross2 see criminal justice- the
criminal law as applied by the police, courts, and prisons - as the
product of a society acting out of consensus to guard its integrity.
They disagree, however, as to the ideal role of criminal justice. Professor Gorecki calls it moral education. Professor Gross sees it as the
exacting of a fair market price for any violation of the rules. While
the writers understand that law does not always follow their ideals of
criminal justice, they nevertheless regard their ideals as practical
guides to action rather than as descriptions of Utopia.

I.

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

AS MORAL

EDUCATION

Professor Gorecki believes criminal justice to be the most important determinant of criminal behavior (p. xiii). He complains that
people who try to solve the problem of crime by discovering and
eradicating its social causes overlook this importance. Even those
people who understand the importance of criminal justice misunderstand its functions to be incapacitation, rehabilitation, and general
deterrence by fear. While Gorecki sees merit in these functions of
punishment, he insists that its greatest value lies in its potential for
moral education. He believes that a properly constructed criminal
justice system will create moral aversion to wrongdoing, and thus
transform prohibitions into moral norms. Only in this way, he says,
can a civilized society control crime (p. xiv).
Gorecki believes that fear is an inadequate deterrent to crime
both because it is a less admirable motivation than morality and because it fails to discourage uncalculated crimes. Gorecki argues that
• Associate Director, Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School. B.A., 1962, Davidson College; MA. 1965, Ph.D. 1966, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. - Ed.
1. Professor of Sociology, University of Illinois.
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moral feelings are real and that they flourish in a stable, free society.
Moreover, he asserts that a severe moral aversion will operate even
in the heat of passion, and will deter crimes even when there is no
threat of retribution. Gorecki would bring about the desired aversions by arranging punishments according to psychological learning
theory.
Gorecki cites two fundamental mechanisms of learning to explain where moral evaluations come from: We can experience the
consequences of our own actions, and come to associate those consequences with the actions, or we can observe other people's experiences and the consequences that follow from their actions. In either
case, we come to feel as good or as bad about the actions as we do
about their consequences (pp. 10-13).
What if the consequences of an action are variable, sometimes
rewarding and sometimes not? Intermittent reward leads to more
persistent occurrence of the behavior, just as the occasional pay-offs
of a slot machine encourage persistent gambling. The actor, knowing he will get a reward eventually though not every time, persists.
Intermittent punishment, on the other hand, does not eradicate the
behavior. The times when there are no punishments are perceived as
times of reward; intermittent punishment is thus intermittent reward
and the behavior becomes entrenched (pp. 14-15).
While it might therefore seem more productive to attempt to influence human behavior through rewards rather than punishments,
Gorecki's concern is with the criminal law. He chooses punishment
as a device for promoting moral learning. Obviously, to work, punishment must follow nearly every occurrence of the proscribed behavior. This is how Gorecki comes to the time-honored conclusion
that criminal sanctions must be a certain consequence of criminal
behavior if the criminal law is to be an effective deterrent. To this
basic argument Gorecki adds one major element. To be moral, as
opposed to just plain powerful, the law must be just. To _be just, the
law must be applied equally to all persons and it must conform with
what most people in the society think is "right." To conform with
what people think is right, the law must match their moral experiences. Thus, there can be justice only when the moral experiences
of the people converge sufficiently to produce in the society a consensus about moral evaluations. Just law must therefore be consistently applied in conformity with the moral consensus of society
(p. 21).
Armed with this conception of how the criminal law could be an
instrument of moral education, Gorecki turns to the American crimi-
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nal justice system. He finds three things wrong with it. First, it contains laws that proscribe activities about which there is no moral
consensus, such as homosexuality and drug abuse. Second, judges
apply the law inconsistently, and both plea bargaining and the indeterminant sentence have institutionalized inconsistency. Finally,
the system fails to provide certainty: officials fail to punish every
violation,3 and constitutional constraints such as the exclusionary
rule offer the guilty a hope of going scot-free.
What should be done? Gorecki considers first the two classes of
crimes that should not be crimes because they do not reflect a moral
consensus. The first class, including crimes such as homosexuality,
should simply be taken off the books, because doing so would remove injustice without risking any harm (p. 95). Of course, not
everyone will be as convinced as Gorecki is that society will reach
this view as a consensus in the near future. The other class of crimes
that should not be crimes includes offenses like drug abuse that are
too complicated to prevent through criminal sanctions. Gorecki considers drug abuse an unjust crime because the addict is powerless not
to be an addict. Nevertheless, Gorecki thinks the use of narcotics
should be supervised, and he will not accept a need to maintain a
drug habit as an excuse for street crime. Therefore a legislature cannot simply abolish drug-abuse laws and consider its work done. It
should provide a cheap, or even free, supply of drugs to persons
whom appropriate authorities certify as addicts. It should also aggressively root out the black market in drugs, so as to prevent the
, creation of new addicts. The sellers alone should be punished (pp.
96-101).
Much more important to Gorecki than decriminalization of unjust crimes is the eradication of sweeping judicial discretion and plea
bargaining (p. 103). He would impose criminal sanctions on police
who fail to enforce all laws, and on prosecutors who fail to prosecute
all cases where conviction is likely. He would limit the discretion of
judges as well, supervising sentencing with an appeals mechanism
that could increase or decrease manifestly inappropriate sentences.
We should retain some judicial discretion, Gorecki argues, because
to fix sentences without consideration of mitigating and aggravating
factors would be unjust. But the judge would have to state specific
reasons for the sentence so the defendant would know whether to
appeal. Finally, Gorecki would limit discretion by eliminating plea
3. Many policymakers have become committed to rooting out the social causes of crime or
to treating rather than punishing violators; Gorecki considers both goals impractical. Pp. 6981.
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bargaining, which he sees as vitiating the law as an instrument of
moral education because it results in punishment that is unrelated to
the actual crime (pp. 103-09).
Gorecki recognizes that his reforms might swamp the system
with far more cases than it can handle. He reassures us that we can
avoid this by eliminating unjust laws and relying more on fines instead of imprisonment to punish some crimes. He would impose
draconian penalties only where a consensus of society clearly supported it (pp. I 09-11 ). However, even the "real" crimes would overwhelm the system unless it were streamlined. Gorecki recommends
such things as consolidation of police departments and improvement
of recruiting and training, use of summary punishments for minor
crimes, coordination of prosecutors' functions within states, centralization of state court systems and the adoption of modem management methods, elimination of pretrial detention except where the
defendant would commit more crimes or hinder gathering of evidence, broader use of depositions, expedition of filing and hearing of
motions, and creation of a "single, swift post conviction remedy for
infringements of constitutional rights" (p. 112).
Gorecki's most controversial proposals are the elimination of juries and the use of means other than plea bargaining to induce confessions. Gorecki would not object to the time-consuming and costly
use of juries if society were willing to pay for them in all trials. But
the present system, he complains, offers perfect justice for only the
five percent of defendants that get jury trials, and a travesty of justice
for the ninety-five percent that plea bargain. Why not consider good
justice - bench trials - for everyone, he asks (pp. 112-15).
Gorecki's approach to confessions may be the most controversial
point in his proposal, and he is unyielding about it. Gorecki insists
that the police must be able to elicit confessions iflaw enforcement is
to be certain. He argues that police cannot elicit confessions unless
they can interrogate the suspect without a lawyer present (since a
good lawyer would advise him not to talk) and tell the suspect (truthfully) that if he refuses to talk they may mention that fact in court.
All this was possible before Miranda v. Arizona 4 and other Supreme
Court decisions of the sixties (pp. 81-89). Gorecki suggests that we
reconsider Miranda by making explicit its underlying values, and
then :find other ways to provide for them. Gorecki points out that
the majority of commentators believe that Miranda does not safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination as a value in itself but
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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rather it serves other values: "protecting the innocent, ensuring procedural fairness, maintaining equality, and protecting society from
unjust law" (p. 118).
Gorecki has no quarrel with protecting the innocent, but he is
less generous about the other three arguments. He notes that the
Supreme Court has construed the prohibition against unfair practices very broadly, even to include things that may happen by accident in the course of any effective investigation. He returns to his
earlier argument that moral evaluations reflect the needs of the society, and suggests that the needs of the society (to convict criminals)
require a narrower exclusion. Gorecki criticizes the equality argument on two grounds: its advocates wrongly assume that only the
poor do not know of their right to keep silent; and they are wrong in
suggesting that society is obligated to teach all criminals to be as
smart about their rights as some of them already are. As for the need
to protect citizens from unjust law, Gorecki maintains simply that in
a democratic society most laws will be just, and that it would be
absurd to cripple the entire criminal justice system because of the
few exceptions.
The solution, to Gorecki, seems simple. The Supreme Court restricted confessions in Miranda only after calls for legislation fell on
deaf ears; thus, proper legislation would eliminate the need for the
Miranda protections. Gorecki feels the state should simply require
electronic surveillance of police interrogation rooms, and unannounced visits to those rooms by specially trained judicial officers.
The police then could dispense with the Miranda warnings, the suspect' s lawyer could be barred from the interrogation, and the interrogators could warn the suspect that they would inform the jury about
his refusal to talk (pp. 122-26).
Gorecki's point is that the Miranda rights were not values in and
of themselves, but a second choice means to prevent the police from
resorting to physical and mental torture. Since he is providing for a
way to keep tabs on those abuses, and since he believes lesser forms
of police pressure to be justified by necessity, he is happy with this
solution.
Gorecki realizes that many people are horrified at his proposals.
They object that such a system would "wreck the lives of a large
proportion of lawbreakers" (p. 128). Gorecki points out, however,
that sentences sufficient to promote moral learning, unlike those necessary for general deterrence by fear, need not be overly long. He
also rejects labeling theory, which argues that prisons breed more
crime. Though popular, the theory has never been proved, and it
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has the moral liability of teaching the criminal to feel that those who
condemn him, not he himself, are responsible for his wrongdoing.
Gorecki believes this undermines the condemnation process, and
therefore impedes moral learning (p. 131). Finally, Gorecki
promises that the carnage will be over after the first generation of
criminals following the reforms meet just and certain punishment.
The moral learning thus engendered will then greatly reduce the
number of criminals (pp. 132-33).

IL

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS SOCIAL CRITICISM

To Hyman Gross, criminal justice is social criticism. The law
provides rules that must be taken seriously by the law-abiding, because they know that the law cannot be broken with impunity. That
is, the law-abiding know that those who intentionally break the law
will not "get away with it." Gross does not suggest for a moment
that all law breakers will be deterred or reformed. He says that the
point of the law is not to stamp out crime, but to reinforce the lawabiding ways of most members of the community.
Gross points out that for the law to function for such a purpose, it
must distinguish between excusable and inexcusable breaking of the
rules. Thus one can defend oneself against an accusation of wrongdoing not only by asserting that one did not do it, but also by asserting that one could not help it, or that one had a right to do it (for
example, to save one's life). Only just and reasonable social criticism
will encourage the law-abiding to respect the law; therefore it is only
blameworthy breaking of the law that we should criticize (pp. 6-13).
In admitting that criminal justice cannot completely stamp out
crime, Professor Gross is much less ambitious in his goals for criminal justice than Professor Gorecki. His book is also more narrowly
focused - it is devoted mainly to clarifying the principles of the law
itself, with relatively little discussion of the processing system.
Gorecki, by contrast, devoted more of his discussion to the processing issues. The distinction is not as great as it might seem, however,
because in both cases the authors' conceptions of proper processing
flow from their conceptions of the nature and purpose of the law.
Like Gorecki, Gross begins by arguing the inadequacy of alternative approaches. Gross and Gorecki agree that removal and correction are not the law's primary functions, but they disagree about
moral criticism. Gross argues that while most illegal acts are also
moral wrongs, the law condemns these acts for reasons other than
that they are immoral. This is shown by the fact that there are many
immoral acts that the law takes no notice of, and many of these are
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more immoral than those the law does take notice of, although they
are not likely to be as harmful. Moreover, some crimes are moral
wrongs only because they are violations of a rule and the person :who
violates the rules takes unfair advantage of those who comply. Such
laws were not made to correct moral wrongs. Finally, the severity of
punishment a law calls for does not correlate with moral gravity of
its violation (pp. 16-17).
Gross's objection to the criminal law as a way of removing or
treating dangerous persons is that the commission of a crime is a
poor way of identifying dangerous people (p. 35). He points out further that, to the extent that we know how to identify seriously dangerous people, civil commitment is a more appropriate mechanism
for removing them from society (p. 45).
Gross then turns to working out his own view in more detail. He
first clarifies what a criminal act is. Both the common law and the
Model Penal Code de.fine a criminal act as a set of bodily movements
accompanied by a mental state; only the coincidence of these two
elements results in criminal liability (p. 49). Gross finds this unsatisfactory because it means that liability depends upon whether the person "meant it." Instead of entering this murky psychological
territory, Gross argues that a criminal act is conduct - not necessarily a distinguishable set of bodily movements - that is culpable. It
is culpable only if it is done intentionally, brings harm, is dangerous,
and is not legitimate (pp. 77-81). An act is intentional, Gross says,
not when accompanied by a particular mental state, but if the actor
exercises control over it (p. 89). Harm is an "untoward occurrence
consisting in a violation of some interest of a person" (p. 115). A
violation of interest includes, of course, attempts to shoot at someone, whether or not the bullet went true. Dangerousness is the degree to which the actor should reasonably have expected harm to
occur (p. 80). Harmful conduct is legitimate if the interests served by
the conduct outweigh the interests that are violated by it (p. 80). The
interest served could be anything from saving one's life to performance of an official duty to promoting the interests of society. Along
these four dimensions, any two acts can be compared and contrasted,
and relative criminal liability can be assessed.
Gross devotes a sizable portion of his book to excuses and justifications, which he collectively calls exculpatory claims. They of
course tum on the four dimensions, and the discussion of how one
escapes culpability does much to illuminate the four dimensions
themselves.
In the final few chapters of the book, Gross turns explicitly to
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what his theory means for the criminal justice system, and why we
impose liability in the first place. After considering alternative views
of the purpose of criminal penalties, he restates his own view: that
criminal law and punishment protect society from disintegration by
maintaining respect for its rules. What is essential is that all persons
know that those who break the law do not get away with it. The
criminal law is not expected to deter all crime, but it does serve to
discourage most citizens from breaking society's rules.
Gross's justification for punishment explains why he examines
the idea of culpability in such great detail: respect for the law is
fostered only when we punish all - and only - culpable conduct.
Either the punishment of inculpable acts or the tolerance of culpable
ones would be disastrous in this respect. It follows that there must
be no. plea bargaining and no overly harsh or overly lenient
sentences.
Still, condemnation does not mean that prison conditions should
be cruel. To the contrary, if barbarous punishment offends people's
sense of justice it will only cause disrespect for the law. Gross points
out, in fact, that even if we believe that it is morally right to make
prisoners miserable in retribution for what they have done, the state
has no right to pursue such moral aims; it is limited by the purpose
of punishment, which is condemnation, a change of status. Realistically, we need not fear that prisons will become attractive places to
be, says Gross, because the law-abiding find the idea of going to
prison quite terrible. It is irrelevant whether criminals find it attractive, since the law is not designed to affe_ct them anyway (pp. 461-63).
Gross does not believe, however, that prison officials should provide therapy (beyond education and the opportunity for good health
and social relations); just as the state has no right to pursue moral
crusades through punishment, so it has no right to pursue them
through treatment. The criminal justice system is not concerned
with taking people apart and remaking them. Gross points out that
it is just plain empirically wrong to assume that because people have
violated the law they have something "wrong with them." The law
is concerned with acts. A criminal act does not reveal at all accurately what kind of person the actor is. The state should, however,
provide treatment when the need for it is established independently,
whether the malady be physical or mental (p. 476).
III.

How

MANY PROPOSALS?

Gorecki and Gross represent their theories as very different, and
indeed upon first impression their ideal justice systems do appear to
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be very _different. One believes that by inculcating moral aversions
in all citizens we can eradicate even crimes of passion. The other
says outright that the justice system can have no effect on those who
are not already committed to obey the law; it serves only to maintain
the respect of the law-abiding.
But what are the essential features of the systems the writers propose? For both writers the justice system must condemn every criminal act in exact proportion to its culpability, no more and no less.
The system must never let a single crime go unpunished, nor can it
punish a single innocent person. Both writers think other approaches, such as treatment, simply do not work, and they are unwilling to impose therapy upon the convicted. Incarceration's only
function is condemnation of the crime.
Even Gorecki's and Grass's apparent disagreement about the relation of law to morality evaporates when we look to their specific
proposals. Gorecki believes that the main purpose of a criminal justice system is moral education. Gross says that the law will do violence to legitimate dissent if it tries to be an enforcer of morality (p.
32). This difference is one of terminology rather than substance,
however. The "morality" that Gross distinguishes from law is the set
of norms about which there is no broad consensus. And Gorecki
would agree that these norms should not be legally prescribed. The
two writers use different language to argue for the same position:
that the justice system should enforce only norms that are founded
on a broad consensus.
Thus, for most practical purposes, Gorecki and Gross propose
the same justice system. But they disagree dramatically on what that
justice system will accomplish. The two books are two dramatically
different advertisements by two different horse sellers. Yet when we
look at the teeth, the horse is the same. In view of the conflicting
advertisements, perhaps we need some additional opinions about the
horse.
Before turning to that, however, let us look briefly at one claim
that both advertisers make: all other models for the justice system,
they assert, are inadequate. In particular, both Gorecki and Gross
are rather quick to dismiss attempts to help criminals, in part on the
ground that such attempts cannot succeed. The evidence far from
unequivocally supports that view. Most of the published studies of
what works in corrections simply evaluate conventional therapies
designed to rehabilitate individuals without interfering very much in
their situation in the community. Yet since even the most innovative
programs generally do not go far enough on a large enough scale to
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indicate the true potential of the treatment approach, Gorecki and
Gross are wrong to conclude all attempts to rehabilitate criminals
must fail.
The problem is illustrated by the attempts at youth correctional
reform in Massachusetts during the 1970s. A recent study reports
that the massive juvenile deinstitutionalization and communitybased correctional reforms during that decade failed to reduce the
state's recidivism rate. 5 That is the kind of study that convinces
Gorecki and Gross that treatment does not work. Yet the same
study isolated a factor that did affect recidivism: the kind of relational networks the youth were involved in in the community what kind of people they associated with, what these people did, and
what they encouraged. 6 The study also showed that the reform programs, while making much progress, simply did not deal with the
confederate problem for a great many of the youth.7 Thus the study,
while showing that the reforms did not reduce the overall recidivism
rate, also gave significant clues as to what would have worked, and
why the reforms fell short.
Gorecki and Gross might object that such discussion is pointless
since the successful program has not yet been demonstrated. If that
is so, we may as well ignore Gorecki's and Gross's work too, for their
programs have not been demonstrated in full working order either.
But if we wish to make progress, we cannot cavalierly dismiss any
new ideas. There is more than one horse, and the race is not yet run.
IV.

IDEALISM AND REALITY

In both Gorecki's and Gross's conceptions the criminal justice
system must strictly adhere to the ideal model. Both writers believe
that inconsistencies and lapses will result in the sense of injustice.
For Gross that will breed disrespect for the law, and make it ineffective as a tool of social criticism. For Gorecki the injustice will rob
the law of its moral force. Thus both men call for radical reforms in
the present system. What are the prospects for such reforms? Both
writers are optimistic, but neither has an empirical foundation for his
optimism. For empirical evidence we must tum to the work of investigators who have studied how law is actually used in society and
how changes in the law come about.
5. R. COATES, A.
147-74 (1978).
6. Id. at 159.
7. Id. at 91-94.
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An example of a concerted attempt to study empirical variations
in the use of law is the work of Donald Black. 8 His material is controversial but, being empirical, it is subject to further empirical
study. Black has investigated when law is used in various societies.
He defines law as governmental social control, 9 and the quantity of
law as the degree to which law is invoked. 10 A complaint to a legal
official, recognition or investigation of the complaint, hearings, arrests, prosecution, surrender, decisions in favor of the plaintiff- all
represent an invocation of the law. 11
Black also considers what kind of people within a society are
most likely to invoke the law. His results suggest that, at least in
part, law is a means whereby the "in-group" - those with power keep the weaker outsiders in line. He finds that the superior tend to
use law against the inferior, the more cultured tend to use law
against the less cultured, the more conventional tend to use law
against the unconventional, the more powerfully organized tend to
use law against the weakly organized, and the upstanding of society
(those who have not been subjected to social control) tend to use law
against the deviant (the targets of earlier social control). 12 Black's
work does not necessarily suggest that law is an illegitimate social
institution, but it does raise questions about its justice. It suggests
that the relationship of justice and the criminal law may be very different than either Gorecki or Gross supposes. Until Gorecki and
Gross demonstrate that the empirical patterns discerned by Black
are not inevitable we cannot be sure that their ideal systems are not
just utopian. Utopias are not necessarily a bad thing, but they
should be clearly labeled as such.
If the patterns that Black found in the uses of law are not inevitable, we must still ask whether changes of the magnitude that Gorecki
and Gross propose can actually take place. The results of the study
of youth correctional reform in Massachusetts help to answer this
question. That study identified five empirical patterns over a twelveyear period in the Massachusetts reform, and found evidence that
these patterns were quite generally applicable to other types of reforms in other times and places: (1) To cause a widespread change
in behavior one must simultaneously (a) facilitate the desired practices and impede the undesired ones, and (b) persuade key actors
8. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976).
9. Id at 2.
10. See id at 3.
ll. Id
12. Id at 21-22, 65, 69, 92, 113-14.
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that they would like to do the desired things and not the undesired
things. A combination of coercion and persuasion is necessary. (2)
To make it possible to develop new patterns one must overcome the
great inertia of the existing ways of doing things. The most effective
means are scandal, public investigation, and expose. (3) It is important for reformers to get the formal decision makers on the side of
change. These are the people who may not have much interest in the
issues but who are very concerned with their prerogatives as decision
makers. (4) Issue-oriented groups that favor and oppose reform
tend to relax their efforts when they seem to be succeeding, thus becoming more' vulnerable to attack, and to resort to extreme tactics
when they get desperate, thus alienating their allies among the formal decision makers. (5) Extreme tactics frequently succeed in the
short run but, since they leave the reformers with fewer allies, eventually lead to defeat. The defeat often follows after the reforms appear to be in place and functioning. The reformers may not clearly
perceive that their earlier extreme tactics led to the final failure. 13
These patterns portray a never-ending struggle. No one is right
all the time. Temporary victories produce only shifting consensuses.
There is little opportunity for the fine tuning that Gorecki and Gross
call for.

************
The literature of the Victorian Age began with the notion that
there was truth, light, goodness, and understanding, and that life was
a quest to find them. The age concluded in some disillusionment,
with a feeling that the meaning of life was in the quest itself, not in
the achievement of any imagined goal. Such disillusionment is perhaps not so terrible. In the Massachusetts reform the best time for
the youth was probably during the height of the process of reform,
rather than after the reforms were in place. It was during the struggle that everyone was paying the most attention to the children. And
the children thrived on that.
Similarly, perhaps the importance of Gorecki's and Gross's
books will be not in the solutions they propose, but in the controversy they provoke. That controversy may excite concern for what
actually happens to real, live, human beings, both victims and offenders. The human beings would thrive on that.

13. See A. MlLLER, L. OHLIN & R. COATES, A THEORY OF SOCIAL REFORM 41-45 (1977).

